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Abstract 
The welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have undergone massive changes since the 
beginning of the 1990s. This paper reviews the literature on welfare state development in CEE in light 
of the theories that have been used to study advanced capitalist democracies. Its purpose is to critically 
assess the extent to which diﬀ erent theories can explain changes in the welfare state during and after 
transition. It argues that until now two strands of literature have crystallised: institutionalism and actor-
centred explanations. Institutionalists agree that welfare reforms are limited by the path dependence 
of the national welfare state structures though this framework is biased towards explaining stability. 
Recent literature seeks to overcome this bias by adding variables that traditionally belong to the actor-
centred paradigm. This essay will argue that the gains from such an approach are exceeded by losses 
in the accuracy and parsimony of explanations. Further, in the actor-centred camp the welfare state 
is seen as a product of bargaining between various national and international actors. Yet the debate 
about who is responsible for the present welfare state arrangements is far from over. Unanswered 
questions revolve around the impact of political parties and ideologies on welfare reforms, the role of 
bureaucracies, the eﬃ  ciency of international ﬁ nancial institutions in advocating retrenchment and the 
precise mechanisms through which all the above actors defend their interests.
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Introduction
Twenty years after the collapse of communism, the literature studying Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) welfare states has not yet reached a conclusion on what explains their variation, their diﬀ erent 
trajectories or the extent of their transformation. This disagreement stems from two sources. First, 
as in the case of the analysis of advanced welfare states, there is disagreement about the object of 
study. Commonly known as the ‘dependent variable problem’ (Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001, Clasen 2007) 
this debate points to the conceptual fuzziness of the welfare state deﬁ nition. In the narrow sense, the 
welfare state denotes the set of state measures that aim at providing key social protection services. 
From this point of view, the welfare state is a basic system of government driven beneﬁ ts that seek to 
provide a minimum level of income, health and safety (Inglot 2008:22). Yet this deﬁ nition obscures the 
political dimension of the welfare state. More comprehensively, following Esping Anderson’s seminal 
work (1990) the welfare states are deﬁ ned  in terms of “how much  they spend, what they do; their 
institutional properties or programmatic content  and how they interact with the market and other 
private arrangements, formal or informal” (Cook 2007a: 9).
Second, the use of diﬀ erent deﬁ nitions of the welfare state impacted the ﬁ ndings generated by 
diﬀ erent research traditions. For example, the comparative literature that tried to establish whether a 
type of CEE welfare state has emerged in the past two decades is mostly inconclusive. Aidukaite (2004, 
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2011) argues that CEE welfare states exhibit a number of distinct institutional similarities (insurance-
based programs that play a major part in the social protection system; high take-up of social security; 
relatively low social security beneﬁ ts; increasing signs of liberalisation of social policy), which allows 
for their classiﬁ cation under a singular post-communist welfare type. On the contrary, others ﬁ nd 
that post-communist welfare states followed diﬀ erent reform trajectories coming to approximate 
Western models (Fenger 2007). At the same time, comparative research has been unsuccessful in 
establishing whether the post-communist countries are generous or not. A comparison with Western 
European countries reveals that, with the exception of Slovenia, CEE welfare states are less generous 
and less eﬀ ective in addressing citizens’ social needs. By contrast, a comparison with other regions 
that exhibit the same level of economic development shows that the post-communist welfare states 
maintained a high commitment to social policies (Haggard & Kaufman 2008). All in all, what emerges 
from this literature is that CEE welfare states do not easily lend themselves to classiﬁ cation into a 
pre-existent typology.
Such classiﬁ cations do not add much to the understanding of the nuts and bolts of the Eastern 
European welfare states. Nor do they clarify the mechanisms that contributed to the emergence of 
the social policy conﬁ gurations in CEE. More productive and theoretically insightful approaches to the 
understanding of CEE welfare states can be found in institutionalist and actor-centred explanations. 
The former take a longue durée perspective and derive the genealogy of the welfare state in the early 
introduction of social policies during the interwar period (Inglot 2008). The latter focus on more 
recent events and model the social policy development based on the interplay between diﬀ erent 
actors (parties, trade unions, governments, international agencies, and multinational corporations). 
In the following sections, I will review each of these two strands of literature and point to their most 
important ﬁ ndings.
Institutionalism
The institutionalist explanations, inspired by the Western historical institutionalist school (Skocpol 
1985, Amenta 2003, Pierson 1994, 2004), argue that early developments of state structures limit the 
range of alternatives for future policies. From this point of view, social policy is ‘locked in’ on a 
particular path of development, which makes it diﬃ  cult for various stakeholders to reform or retrench 
the already adopted programs. At best, what they can accomplish is a marginal reform of the core 
elements of the welfare state.
Understood from this standpoint, post-communist welfare states consist of a combination of 
basic institutional layers that date back to the interwar period (Inglot 2003, 2008, 2009). These layers 
correspond to the periods of state building and rebuilding, during which politically motivated welfare 
measures were undertaken by elites. With time, these measures ‘froze’ into permanent structures, 
hence the hybrid nature of the post-communist welfare states. At their core, the systems of social 
protection share the (incomplete) Bismarkian legacy of work-related social insurance. Later, the 
socialist expansion period has added a new layer of institutions characterised by pay-as-you-go 
systems, full employment, national health service, aﬀ ordable housing family programs and limited 
means tested beneﬁ t schemes (Inglot 2008). Over decades, the socialist welfare states became an 
intricate set of entitlements and beneﬁ ts, which served as an instrument of control and diﬀ erentiation.
Social privileges were used by planners to limit the autonomy of trade unions that developed into 
simple ‘transmission belts’. Unions began to be recognised mainly through their administrative role 
in the delivery of workplace beneﬁ ts, ranging from holiday tickets to subsidised heating and childcare 
services. On the other hand, during this period, social policies reinforced the hierarchical structure 
of society by delivering privileges to loyal groups, while denying it to others. Throughout transition, 
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the policies, which constituted the core of the socialist and interwar period, have been ‘reconﬁ gured’ 
rather than fundamentally altered (Stark 1996). Hence, the beginning of the transition period was “a 
rare historic event of regime change that involved reproduction of the welfare state” (Inglot 2008: 
296), during which reforms built upon previous welfare structures. Although reform blueprints have 
been made available both by domestic and international actors, the post-communist elites have failed 
to radically change the logic of social protection policies. The ‘lock-in’ was caused by several factors. 
First, the new elites lacked the necessary expertise in social policy, which made them dependent on 
the older bureaucrats. Second, soon after regimes collapsed, elites realised that a complete overhaul 
of social policies would be impossible due to the inherited legacies and patterns of policy making. As 
a result, the reforms that have been introduced since the 1990s depended on legacies that provided 
accessible solutions for the social problems created by the economic transition.
The backbone of the institutionalist legacy argument lies in its reliance on the path dependency 
explanation of social policy change. An important theoretical addition of this approach is its rejection 
of claims that the transition to capitalism took place in an ‘institutional vacuum’ (Karl & Schmitter 
1991). Furthermore, this argument lends itself to the analysis of diﬀ erent evolutionary paths that CEE 
welfare states have undertaken since the adoption of their ﬁ rst social insurance systems. Considering 
their diﬀ erent histories of the timing and sequencing of social policy adoption, the CEE countries 
evolved into diﬀ erent welfare systems with various degrees of coverage and entitlements. For 
example, when comparing the Czech and Hungarian cases, Inglot (2008) underlines the importance of 
the early establishment of a strong welfare ministry and the involvement of trade unions combined 
with a strong social democratic orientation for the Czech system. By contrast, in Hungary the welfare 
state remained mostly underdeveloped prior to the socialist period, which made the expansion of 
entitlements slower and less consistent.
Furthermore, the institutionalist literature rightly points out that part of the variation in the 
welfare state development in CEE can be accounted for by the early responses to the systemic crisis 
that aﬀ ected all the countries in the early 1990s. While the transitional recession aﬀ ected all countries 
in the region, its intensity diﬀ ered. Compared with the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries in CEE, 
the transitional recession was much shallower and the recovery was faster, which allowed this group 
of countries to maintain the provision of welfare. However, the institutionalist argument does not 
convincingly argue why exactly some of the welfare legacies inherited from previous regimes had an 
enabling eﬀ ect during transition, while others proved to have negative consequences. More speciﬁ cally, 
the institutionalist literature needs to better operationalise the concept of path dependency in order 
to uncover its eﬀ ects.
Moreover, the analytical lenses that are used in the institutionalist analyses do not catch entirely 
the short-term behaviour of the welfare states during transition. Both the CEE and FSU countries 
behaved diﬀ erently during the transformational recession: Poland increased its welfare eﬀ ort (Cook 
2007b), Bulgaria chose to decrease expenditures, while Ukraine maintained previous levels. Also, the 
policies which have been used to respond to the downward economic pressures diﬀ ered: Poland 
and Hungary increased early retirement beneﬁ ts, Bulgaria and Romania reduced unemployment 
beneﬁ t levels and expanded the coverage of disability beneﬁ ts, while FSU countries avoided massive 
unemployment through reliance on wage arrears.
In an eﬀ ort to understand these changes, recent literature relies on more recent neo-institutionalist 
accounts (Mahoney & Thelen 2010) to uncover the motives for the variation in welfare policies. 
Variation is not necessarily linked to ‘critical junctures’ but can be produced by incremental changes 
or even more by path-departing, path-creating or path-breaking transformations (Cerami & Vanhuysse 
2009: 3-4). Building on this framework, variation in welfare policies is explained by a combination 
of historical and political factors that condition the functioning of the welfare state. However, the 
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introduction of politics in the institutional paradigm alters the meaning of the very concepts that 
institutionalists use. Ultimately, the use of ‘politics’ as an explanatory variable by the East European 
neo-institutionalists serves more as a way of avoiding to grasp the determinants of welfare state 
transformation in CEE rather than a productive research tradition. If parsimony is a virtue, then this 
direction of welfare state research is sure to avoid it.
The inevitable conclusion reached by researchers working in the neo-institutionalist paradigm is 
that over the past two decades CEE welfare states became hybrid models (Cerami & Vanhuysse 2009, 
Keune 2008). This label is in itself a tautological product of the mixed pedigree that characterises the 
neo-institutional paradigm. It is also a way to circumvent the need to theorise based on the empirical 
realities that characterise the institutional transformations in the region.
A more promising research avenue should take into account not only the national histories of 
welfare reform and retrenchment but also their links with the capitalist systems, which developed 
concomitantly. This will allow for a less rigid classiﬁ cation of the CEE welfare systems, as well as 
for a substantive understanding of the expansion and retrenchment patterns, while avoiding the 
pitfalls of contradicting the assumptions of historical institutionalism. A ﬁ rst step in this direction 
was taken by Bohle and Greskovits (2007), who include a social dimension together with  an economic 
development, macroeconomic stability and marketisation dimensions in their taxonomy of capitalist 
systems in Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that there is no explicit causal mechanism put forward by 
the authors that connects the institutional welfare settings with the level of economic growth and 
industrial upgrading, it is implicitly suggested that they co-vary. The Baltic States are characterised 
by high inequalities, low social expenditure and low social inclusiveness, while relying on resource 
intensive or unskilled-labour intensive traditional industries. In contrast, the Visegrad states score 
fairly well in terms of addressing inequalities and promoting social inclusiveness while relying on 
capital and skill intensive industries. The immediate implication of a capitalist welfare framework 
is that besides the institutional legacies, what matters for the welfare state transformation are the 
trajectories of national industrial development. These diﬀ erent trajectories that have been followed 
by the CEE states have enabled the creation of “self-reinforcing patterns of developmental and social 
policies and performances” (Bohle & Greskovits 2007: 30).
What remains to be spelled out is how these institutional and industrial legacies interact with each 
other and limit the strategies of political actors.  Such a challenge can be undertaken by extending 
the focus of research to the entire post-communist region and avoiding the pitfalls of generalising 
from one or few cases. In other words, instead of taking the conclusions of Western institutionalist 
literature for granted, Eastern Europeanists should ask their own questions. In the following section, 
I review the actor-centred explanations of welfare state transformations in CEE. I focus on the main 
theories that have been used to explain actors’ inﬂ uence on the post-communist welfare pathways 
and identify their most important claims.
Actor-centred explanations
Those in favour of actor-centred explanations of social policy change in CEE start their analysis with 
the fall of the communist regime in the beginning of the 1990s. While they do not explicitly reject the 
claims made by historical institutionalists, they construct the transformation of social policies based 
on the tactical actions in which political and economic stakeholders have engaged. These stakeholders 
can be: national actors (political parties, trade unions, business groups, statist bureaucracies) or 
international organisations.
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National actors
In an early attempt to analyse the position of left parties towards social policy reforms, Cook et al. 
(1999) ﬁ nd that parties can be divided into three main groups, depending on their policy preferences 
and genealogical roots: the unreformed left is the direct successor of the communist party and seeks 
to preserve the socialist values or to fully reinstate the socialist system, the reformed social democrats 
who advocate for a slow transition to market with the state assuming its role in the provision of social 
beneﬁ ts, and the historically-based social democrats who also advocate a social market approach. 
Further, the authors ﬁ nd that when in power, left parties assume a pro-welfare discourse “seeking 
to defend or re-establish the welfare state values in the new political context” (Cook et al. 1999: 241). 
An interesting ﬁ nding of the study is that left parties in CEE do not pursue broadly social democratic 
welfare state policies as described in Esping Anderson’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). 
Instead they either defend the welfare state against neo-liberal or ad-hoc full dismantling or they 
adopt a centrist position, speaking more to the median voter rather than to a purely left constituency. 
On the other hand, communist successor parties have been successful in the electoral arena only 
when they had a credible pro-reform and pro-European orientation, and if they beneﬁ ted from strong 
institutional links with nomenklatura elites, trade unions or other economically-based interest groups 
(Orenstein 1998: 473-474). This meant that in order to be successful, left wing parties had to move to 
the centre, which made them have an ambiguous position towards social policy reforms.
Similarly, right wing parties had an interest in re-forming the welfare state. During the early 
period of transition, liberalising parties in government pursued strategies of liberalisation through the 
decentralisation of services, shifting responsibilities, legalisation of private providers and reduction of 
state subsidies and broad entitlements. However, these reforms took place in a chaotic environment, 
which left room for ad hoc policy reversal (Cook 2007b). In the Baltics as well as in Bulgaria, centre 
right coalitions have dominated in most of the post-communist governments, which steered the 
welfare reforms towards a liberal path. In Romania, where the political landscape has been in a 
constant ﬂ ux during transition, despite a balance between centre right and left governments in power, 
the welfare state remained minimal and has been used as a tool to win elections. 
Frameworks stressing the role of historical-structural factors for the development of early patterns 
of party competition stress that where social support for communism was weak, creating ‘national 
accommodationist’ regimes, successor parties embraced economic reform after 1990, which blurred 
the division between left and right on the socio-economic dimension (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Haggard 
& Kauﬀ man (2008) reach a similar conclusion for the CEE region. They contend that ”ﬁ scal constraint 
and the legacy of earlier welfare systems has made the role of strong left parties more ambiguous 
and varied” (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 360). Moreover, partisan diﬀ erences in respect to social policy 
positions have converged in environments characterised by “wide entitlements and strong public 
expectations” (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 360).
Tavits and Letki (2009) reach a diﬀ erent conclusion about the inﬂ uence of parties on government 
spending. They ﬁ nd that leftist parties had stronger incentives and better opportunities to pursue 
welfare reforms. The task of carrying out welfare reforms was undertaken by leftist parties because 
they needed to prove their commitment to democratic values. Further, they could count on a more 
loyal electorate and, therefore, did not fear substantial electoral swings in the face of policy reversals. 
However, the imaginative argument put forward by the two authors does not hold for the entire 
region. The Romanian social democrats largely avoided welfare reforms both in the beginning of the 
transition and when in power between 2000 and 2004. Similarly, the Bulgarian left avoided any major 
welfare reforms during their stay in power until the mid-1990s. After 2005, when they came back to 
power as part of the grand coalition government, they defended the generosity of the pay-as-you-go 
pension system against attacks form the right.
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What can be said about this literature is that it produced contradictory ﬁ ndings about the impact 
of political parties on social policy reforms. The ﬁ ndings are mostly inﬂ uenced by the sample of 
countries, which is used in the analysis and the method (quantitative studies support the transposition 
of roles hypothesis, while qualitative studies reach the conclusion that the parties have a mixed role 
in the economic reforms). However, one point of agreement between the qualitative and quantitative 
analyses is that Eastern European party politics are at odds with their Western counterparts.  
Other authors have paid more attention to the manner in which social policy reforms have been 
used by elites to achieve social peace. Vanhuysse (2006, 2009) has argued that in anticipation of the 
distributive conﬂ icts determined by the transition to a market economy, elites have used welfare 
reforms to pacify the groups which had the capacity to organise through division. The argument 
rests on the assumptions that a) the working class has been accustomed to a system that guaranteed 
employment security, in which b) the level of real income was a matter of political decision making, and 
that c) with the transition to political democracy, the workers acquired extensive political resources 
and d) had every reason to use them, given the economic vagaries created by the transformational 
recession. The political elite understood these threats and reacted by using welfare policies to split the 
interests of groups with the potential to organise and make collective action diﬃ  cult. This resulted in 
the creation of ‘abnormal’ groups of pensioners and the unemployed, besides the regular pensioners 
and workers. Vanhuysse’s argument rests on the powerful assumption that indeed there was elite 
agency in the planning and using of social policies to diﬀ use the protest potential of diﬀ erent groups. 
Here, the author provides no evidence that in light of protests that took place in the early 1990s, the 
elite decided to demobilise protesters. Nor it is clear from the argument why speciﬁ cally social policies 
and no other measures have been chosen to ensure social peace.
While the above argument seems to ﬁ t the politics of pension reforms in Poland and Hungary well, 
its wider applicability is questionable. Romania and Bulgaria, two countries that also saw a dramatic 
increase in absolute numbers of pensioners during transition, did not have the capable governments 
or the welfare resources that the Visegrad countries had. Thus, in light of the comparison between the 
two countries and the Visegrad group it is doubtful to what extent the abnormal groups have been the 
result of purposive action by capable governments or a result of the economic restructuring, which all 
the countries in the region witnessed. On the other hand, it is not obvious why workers accepted to 
go on early retirement and unemployment, given that these programs have not been generous enough 
to entirely ‘decommodify’ their living or stable enough to be trusted.
Furthermore, looking at other countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, politically capable 
groups have exercised threats to the stability of the system, but the response went along diﬀ erent 
lines. The elites sought to preserve employment by delaying economic restructuring, rather than 
using early retirement schemes to preserve social peace. Thus, the politics of welfare seems to be 
connected with the success or failure of the industrial reform, rather than with elite agency. Indeed 
as Gimpelson (2001) notes, despite the fact that the transformational recession in Russia has been 
much longer and deeper than initially expected, massive unemployment came only after a delay. This 
happened because politicians viewed unemployment as a major threat to political stability and sought 
to avoid it. Unemployment has been kept at moderate levels by using stop-and-go monetary policies, 
insider privatisation, and open and hidden subsidies to producers. For workers, this has translated to 
underemployment and mounting wage arrears. These policies have been facilitated by an institutional 
inheritance from the Soviet era, during which factories were hubs for the provision of important 
welfare beneﬁ ts (health care, housing, holidays, kindergartens, heating subsidies, etc.). The post-
communist governments in Russia and Ukraine continued to keep workers practically tied to their 
enterprises through the provision of fringe beneﬁ ts. This resulted in limited industrial restructuring 
and in the keeping of sizeable workforces at the plant level (Gimpelson 2001, Boeri & Terrell 2002, 
Varga 2011).
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Yet other authors (Aidukaite 2004, Cook 2007a, 2010) have emphasised the role played by statist 
bureaucracies in preserving the Soviet era entitlements. From this perspective, social policies have 
not been a direct response to the political demands made by social classes but a system of privileges 
that the bureaucratic elites used in political exchanges. Cook (2007a) makes this point clear for the 
case of Belarus. She argues that even when reforms took place, they were vulnerable to signiﬁ cant 
compromises between political actors and the bureaucracy. In a context of limited privatisation and 
weak civil society, elites remained dependent on state subsidies and administrative positions. These 
stable elites formed the foundation for Lukashenka’s power. In turn, the President relied on this 
arrangement “to deliver compliance and votes of their subordinates” (Cook 2007a: 205). The social 
policies have been a central part in maintaining this self-reinforcing formula in which the bureaucracy 
preserved its access to privileges, while Lukashenka held control over the country. This setting left 
very little space for welfare state restructuring in Belarus. Besides preventing reform, the capturing of 
social protection systems by bureaucratic and statist elites made them more polarised. They became 
systems of provision of special privileges to certain groups, while the rest of the population relied on 
the informal delivery of welfare services. The socialist system of beneﬁ ts was mostly kept in place, and 
the state continued to ﬁ nance and administer education, pensions and health sectors. As in Russia 
and Ukraine, enterprises in Belarus kept their social facilities and continued the delivery of fringe 
beneﬁ ts. Unemployment remained very low, which delayed the introduction of an unemployment 
beneﬁ t system until 1999. The unemployment beneﬁ ts remained generally below the subsistence level. 
Similarly, statist bureaucrats played an important role in the early development of social policies 
in other CEE countries. In dealing with these groups, CEE governments in democratic polities that 
sought to reduce entitlements did it selectively by compensating politically inﬂ uential bureaucrats for 
lost beneﬁ ts (the compensation hypothesis). This partially explains the variation in the timing and 
scope of welfare reforms across CEE.
By comparison, the inﬂ uence of civil society and, in particular, of trade unions on social policy 
making has been painted in much darker colours. Eastern European trade unions have been generally 
qualiﬁ ed as weak and as “having a low capacity to shape public policy or to win material beneﬁ ts 
on behalf of their members” (Crowley & Ost 2001: 214). Two arguments have been put forward to 
explaining the quiescence and general weakness of trade unions in CEE: the ideological legacy argument 
and the structural conditions argument. The ideological legacy argument claims that unions in CEE 
are generally weak because their roots in the socialist system led to legitimacy problems during post-
communism. Unions faced the double task of restructuring in order to respond to the demands of the 
new economy and building a credible ideological alternative to the free market discourse. However, 
they failed in both tasks as they did not understand their new role (Crowley & Ost 2001), nor did they 
manage to present a credible alternative to the free market ideology. On the other hand, workers 
saw trade unions as relics of the past. They perceived the unions as organisations subordinated to 
management and incapable of eﬀ ectively representing their demands. In addition, unions themselves 
gave up on organising workers’ interests. In a discussion of the Polish case, David Ost (2000, 2006) 
argues that the Solidarity trade union ignored the needs of workers and ended up embracing a 
catholic nationalist discourse. Instead of incorporating workers’ demands and developing class-based 
identities, the elites gave up on labor, which when left alone was captured by illiberal parties. As 
a result, trade unions registered signiﬁ cant losses in their membership, their capacity to organise 
strikes and participate in collective bargaining agreements.
The second argument that seeks to explain the weakness of trade unions in CEE focuses on the 
factors outside of labour’s immediate control (Varga 2011). This literature focuses on the room to 
manoeuver, which labour had during transition, and on the interaction between labour and political 
parties, management and business. The managerial elite created in the early years of transition had 
a stake in keeping the union power at bay because it sought to preserve its control of the plants. 
Furthermore, the governments that had control over the strike legislation and workers’ representation 
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bodies sought to limit the political inﬂ uence of the trade unions. This made David Ost conclude 
that in Eastern Europe a form of ‘illusory corporatism’ has emerged, in which institutions of labour 
representation are merely formal bodies with no real inﬂ uence over the policy making process. Meardi 
(2011) also concludes that employment relations in the New Member States are heading in a neo-liberal 
direction characterised by weak institutions for employee participation and employee representation.
The gist of both arguments about labour weakness presented above is that trade unions are 
generally weak and did little to inﬂ uence the social policy making. As Meardi (2011) shows, the weakness 
of the trade unions resulted in poor social rights altogether and minimal welfare states which are 
unbalanced in favour of the older generations. New generations receive little in terms of employment 
security due to the liberalisation of labour law, receive expensive and unsecure contribution based 
pensions, and are faced with increasingly privatised systems of education and healthcare and receive 
little close to no beneﬁ ts in kind from their employers. The implications of this minimalist welfare 
regime are that younger generations that entered the labour market during the 90s or those who are 
entering now have no power to control their work-related beneﬁ ts and are forced to accept any job. 
On the other hand, trade unions completely lost their capacity to monitor working conditions and 
negotiate collective agreements, which leaves workers in a defenceless situation.
More recent and ﬁ ne-grained accounts of labour activity in CEE reach slightly diﬀ erent conclusions. 
Varga analyses the trade union strategies in Romania and Ukraine, arguing that “labour is no monolith 
in sharing the same characteristics irrespective of time and space”(Varga 2011: 33), and that there 
is variation in labour weakness outcome. Both Romanian and Ukrainian unions have been capable 
of successfully organising workers’ anger, despite the structural diﬃ  culties posed by the transition 
phase. Evidence from the Ukrainian trade union activism during the recent economic crisis suggests 
that unions have not been at all quiescent, as the legacy or structuralist arguments would expect, 
but mobilised against plant closures, and they have managed to cancel layoﬀ s and have wage arrears 
returned (Varga 2011). Further, Bernaciak et al. (2011) ﬁ nd that trade unions in sheltered sectors in 
Poland and Serbia have managed to successfully organise and prevent restructuring while defending 
employment-related privileges in their constituencies. Similarly, in the Baltics a series of strikes by 
trade unions in the public sector during the recent economic crisis led to the resignation of the 
Latvian Education Minister in 2008 and allowed trade unions to have a say in the negotiation of public 
sector cuts.
Hence, contextual evidence shows that the legacy and structuralist arguments cannot fully 
account for union activism in CEE. While they can capture the general trend of union decline, which 
is supported by macro-data, they are wrong in concluding that trade unions are doomed to remain 
weak. This misrepresentation of union activism and inﬂ uence in CEE stems from the fact that macro-
comparative studies tend to analyse only what Silver (2003) and Wright (2000) call associational power 
– the various forms of power that result from the collective organisation of workers, while ignoring 
workers’ structural power – “the power that accrues to workers simply from their location in the 
economic system” (Silver 2003: 13). Structural power can result either from tight labour markets or 
from the strategic location of groups of workers in key industrial sectors. Further analyses of union 
behaviour should account both for the macro dynamics as well as for the sectoral dynamics of union 
organisation and inﬂ uence.
International organisations
The inﬂ uence of international actors on domestic policy making in CEE is widely recognised. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) have been of key importance in shaping the 
timing and content of social policy reforms. World Bank promoted the restructuring of the old welfare 
structures and provided governments with technical and ﬁ nancial assistance. Deacon and Stubbs 
(2007) note that although the impact of international ﬁ nancial institutions (IFIs) is variable, they are 
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relevant and any analysis of social policy change should understand their role. Furthermore, Deacon 
and Hulse (1997) ﬁ nd that CEE provided a testing ground for social policy making in the industrialised 
world. They argue that policy advice from the IMF and the conditionalities attached to the loans given 
by IMF to the countries in need were associated with expenditure cuts and signiﬁ cant reductions in 
entitlements, such as unemployment beneﬁ ts. Analysing the inﬂ uence of international actors on the 
pension reforms, Orenstein (2009) claims that pension reforms in the late 1990s and 2000s have been 
under heavy inﬂ uence of a World Bank policy campaign that started in the 1990s. The adoption of the 
pillar system advocated by the WB throughout CEE stands as evidence that the transnational actors 
played a crucial role in pension reform decisions.
The literature that focuses on FSU countries argues that while international pressure for welfare 
reforms existed, this pressure has been mediated by domestic actors (Cook 2007a). IFIs relied on 
cooperation with governments and reformist elites to have access to domestic polities and endorse 
their agendas. Thus, the IFI eﬀ orts to promote means for testing social assistance, pension privatisation 
and medical insurance have been conditioned by the outcomes of national political struggles. This led 
to the variable success of programs for privatisation and means testing in FSU countries. Similarly, in a 
comparison of three CEE countries Orenstein and Haas (2005) show that in the ﬁ rst years of transition 
the IFIs paid little attention to the domestic social policies, which allowed national elites to freely 
enact their ideas. However, towards the mid-1990s a more coherent international social policy agenda 
began to be implemented with the support of WB and in cooperation with local elites. Evidence 
from the recent economic downturn suggests that a shift in the policy advice by IFIs took place. 
Unlike during previous crises when IMF pushed for pension privatisation, during the recent crisis the 
institution did not push for further privatisation reforms even in countries where such reforms were 
planned (Orenstein 2011). It remains to be seen whether this is just an emergency response or a more 
long lasting shift in policy ideas at the international level.
A speciﬁ c role in the literature is occupied by the studies that aim at capturing the inﬂ uence of 
the European Union (EU) on the national social policy agendas. Traditionally these studies have been 
concerned with the question of convergence of the new member states (NMS) with the European 
Social Model (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003, Draxler & Van Vliet 2010, Vural 2011, Whyman et al. 2012). 
Most of these studies found that the convergence hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence. 
Moreover, ﬁ ndings suggest that the liberal reform agenda promoted by the EU, which was focused on 
labour market deregulation and ﬂ exibilisation, exacerbated the already high inequalities in the NMS. 
This tendency is the result of the increased importance of atypical employment, especially part-time 
and ﬁ xed term contracts (Whyman et al. 2012: 40).
By and large, the Europeanisation literature seems to agree on the negative impact of the EU on 
the national social policy system. It seems that the old lesson provided by the Washington Consensus 
– that one size does not ﬁ t all has not been fully comprehended by the European policy makers. 
However, as it is clear by now, the impact of the recent economic crisis has reinforced the calls for 
more ﬂ exibility and deregulation. With the exception of a short private pension reversal intermezzo 
(Drahokoupil & Domonkos 2012), it seems that neo-liberal solutions prevailed across CEE.
Conclusion
The literature that discusses the factors underlying welfare state change in CEE is still evolving. 
However, by now at least two agendas of research are crystallised, and I have tried to outline them 
above. The institutionalists put their faith in the endurance of institutions and their ability to constrain 
the choices that actors have. More recent developments of institutionalist explanations make use of 
ideas and discourses to provide more ﬁ ne-grained accounts of welfare state change. Yet this eﬀ ort to 
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break with the bias towards explaining stability that characterises institutionalist explanations might 
prove counterproductive if the mechanisms that allow the interplay between institutions and ideas 
are not properly speciﬁ ed.
The actor-centred explanations make use of the political science literature and condition welfare 
state reforms on the diﬀ erent power constellations that exist both at the national and international 
levels. However, with few exceptions (Cook et al. 1999, Cook 2007a), this literature focuses mostly on 
the Visegrad countries, while leaving aside the other CEE and CIS countries. From this point of view, 
we need better descriptions and explanations of the politics of welfare states outside these cases. 
This will bring a much needed test for the theories of welfare state change that are used nowadays. 
Further, expanding the pool of countries that are analysed would provide a better understanding of 
the speciﬁ cities of the region and allow for better theorising of the causal mechanisms that contribute 
to the welfare state change.
If anything, it is clear that the debate around the welfare state is far from being over.  But 
more systematic tests and better empirical evidence are needed. Simply borrowing the theories 
and frameworks that have been used for explaining welfare state change in the West proved to be 
counterproductive. Understanding what is really driving welfare state transformations in the East 
calls for more qualitative as well as quantitative work. The former should strive for a more theoretical 
understanding of the cases and not stop with the inherent idiosyncrasies provided by case studies. 
The latter should get out of trying to ﬁ t the Eastern countries into predetermined typologies and rely 
more on the evidence provided by small-N studies.
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